The Naval Reserve Act of 1925 created the Naval Intelligence Volunteer Service. The objective was to develop a nucleus of reserve officers who, by virtue of their education, training and experience in civilian life, would be immediately available in time of national emergency to assume duties and perform the functions of Naval Intelligence Officers at home and abroad.

        Quotas for reservists were gradually increased, reaching 536 in 1936. District Intelligence Officers and the Naval Attaches began estimating their wartime needs, and mobilization training plans were established. All members of the Naval Reserve were mobilized into the regular Navy in World War II.

        After the war, Reserve Intelligence Units were created. These units were loosely organized with a primary mission of internal training. The reserve program was divided into two parts; surface intelligence and air intelligence. The surface intelligence program was supported by the District Intelligence Officer of each Naval District. The air intelligence program administered by Air Intelligence Program Officers (AIPOs).

        During the 1960’s, the surface segment was reorganized into 13 Naval Reserve Intelligence Divisions composed of 100 Naval Reserve Units containing 1,300 officer billets and a small number of yeoman. The air program consisted of 25 Naval Air Intelligence Reserve Units containing 820 officer and 345 enlisted billets. An additional 230 officer and 100 enlisted photo intelligence billets were scattered among other units of the Naval Air Reserve.

        In the late 1960’s the Total Force Policy stipulated reliance on the organized reserve in an emergency and required integration of active and reserve units in contingency planning. Task performing reserve units were to be tailored to meet the emergency needs of specific Naval activities. As an outgrowth of this concept and the Reserve Analytical Studies Project begun in 1973, the Chief of Naval Reserve proposed to CNO the restructuring of the air and surface intelligence reserve programs. The result, OPNAVNOTE 5400 of 15MAY1974, “Restructuring of the Naval Reserve”, created the naval Reserve Intelligence Program (NRIP) combining both surface and air programs into a single entity.

        The NRIP was established with a total allowance of 4,993 personnel - 2,940 officers and 2,053 enlisted. There were 148 authorized units of 30 different types drilling in 73 cities in the U.S., Puerto Rico and the United Kingdom under the direction of a selected Reserve 1635 designator Flag Officer entitled; Director, Naval Reserve Intelligence Program. The units were divided for management purposes into 19 Reserve Intelligence Areas each with a Reserve Intelligence Area Coordinator (RIAC) and a Reserve Intelligence Program Officer (RIPO) assigned for Area management.

        Enlisted ratings within the NRIP have been an integral part of it’s history, and the billets have been traditionally manned by high quality personnel. Most enlisted intelligence related training was carried forward from pre-1974 plans of the air and surface units. Advance training was left to the self-study process. In 1974 the Navy established a new Intelligence Specialist (IS) rating and provided for rating conversion by Photo Intelligence (PT) and Yeoman (YN) personnel. Since enlisted billets were only 44% filled in 1974, emphasis was placed on soliciting conversions.

        In 1974, the majority of NRIP personnel were placed in Area Analysis Units (AAU). This concept was created by Fleet Intelligence Center (FIC) Pacific, Fleet Intelligence Center Europe and Atlantic, and Commander, Naval Intelligence Command in connection with the original restructuring, and was designed for both peacetime and mobilization roles. Thirty AAUs were instituted to provide geographic area analysis for the FICs. The AAUs were renamed Fleet Intelligence Rapid Support Teams (FIRSTs) in 1976.

DNRIP/CNRIC 19 SEP 1987 - 27 JUN 1992

        The Headquarters of the NRIP was relocated from the Naval Station Treasure Island California to the Naval Air Station, Dallas, Texas in September 1987. Rear Admiral Gene Dickey relieved Rear Admiral Robert Tiernan as the Director. At that time the leadership did not have the authority or accountability commensurate with their responsibilities. The NRIP had no control over resources, and the modest resource support received was sporadic and irregular. The DNRIP did not select or approve the RIACs or unit COs. He sat on the Selection Board approving the local Training Administrative Reserve (TAR) selections/approvals at the pleasure of CNAVAIRRESFOR. The Program was managed, and the leadership provided by the Selected Reserve (SELRES) and the TAR communities. Nevertheless, it was clear that the Chain of Command, responsibility, resources and accountability was lacking. By this time the ground work was laid, and many battles had been fought by Rear Admiral Tiernan, his Staff and previous Reserve Managers to gain the support and approval for the establishment of the NRIP as a Command with all the authority, responsibility and accountability attributed thereto.

        OPNAV Notice 5450 of 27 October 1988 re-designated the Director as Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command and established the NRIP as an Echelon IV Command. These efforts concluded with the Command Establishment Ceremony and the implementation of the Command Directives on 14 January 1989. The previous year had been spent in developing the necessary structures to support the changing responsibilities and management associated with the Command authority.

        The major strengths at that time resided in the quality and commitment of the Officer and Enlisted Personnel (SELRES and TAR) and the strong relationship with the active duty supported commands. It was apparent however, that the force was not adequately structured, funded or equipped to contribute to the active force and to national defense. Therefore, in 1988 and 1989, the following Objectives were established and aggressively pursued:

TRAINING - During this period, the Basic Reserve Intelligence Training (BRIT) courses and curriculum were developed and approved by the Naval Education and Training Command (CNET). These courses consisted of several modules and provided the basis for both Officer and Enlisted training.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION - The targeting of specific retention and recruiting problems were addressed. Enlisted recruiting was a high priority and the Direct Commission (DIRCOM) Program received high priority as well as candidates with prior active service. RESOURCES - Resources were totally inadequate, therefore as aggressive log term POM process was implemented to satisfy intelligence production requirements. Thoroughly justified responses to all budget calls and budget reviews were given top priority.

FACILITIES - Facilities were inadequate and in many cases nonexistent. Initiatives to ensure that all NRIP units had access to SCIF spaces were established. Several co-utilization Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) for use of SCIF spaces were completed. Processes were established and given highest priority for funding to upgrade and/or build new facilities in order to ensure all units had access to SCIF spaces.

EQUIPMENT - Planning and identification of ADP and Communications equipment necessary for intelligence production and administrative management were identified. Budgetary processes were formalized. The basic objective of this initiative was to provide secure connectivity between Gaining Commanders and the reserve production SCIF facilities. This effort was given top priority since secure connectivity was required to utilize the capacity of well trained members of the CNRIC in a flexible manner to produce real-time actionable intelligence for the active force.

GAINING COMMAND/MUTUAL SUPPORT - Given the talented personnel available to the Intelligence Command, it was apparent that training, facilities and the upgrading of secure communications (connectivity) would greatly enhance the potential for meaningful support to the active Gaining Commanders. With these improvements, continuous off-site production capacity was possible. This would increase the productivity of reserve members and also provide flexibility throughout the week and on weekends, Additionally it was clear a strategic issue since resources and facilities would be highly decentralized. These efforts were fully embraced by the active duty commanders. Production by reserve units increased considerably and the dependency on reserve units by active duty commanders likewise increased.

MANAGEMENT - Increased emphasis was placed on accountability, reporting, inspections, performance, security, awards and recognition. Each of these areas increased in importance as the Command structure was developed and formalized.

- to be continued -